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Discussing the implications of the Chinese seizure of Taiwan from the Dutch in 1662

I blogged about the 350th anniversary of Koxinga seizing Taiwan from the Dutch here. I was therefore very pleased to see an article by Tonio Andrade, author of Lost Colony, in The Diplomat discussing what the battle can tell us about war with China. I agree that some points may be drawing a long bow but there is still some interesting food for thought.

But the war also has lessons for today, because among the factors that enabled the Chinese to win was a rich, effective, and, to Westerners, mysterious military tradition – a strategic culture that provided a discernable boost to Chinese warcraft. The Dutch, famous in Europe for their weapons, tactics, and logistics, found themselves hopelessly outclassed by the Chinese. Since military leaders in China today are still deeply imbued with this traditional military culture, it behooves us to study it.

1 February marks the 350th anniversary of Koxinga's seizing of Taiwan from the Dutch

Koxinga (Source: Wikipedia)

While reading the current edition of the BBC History Magazine, I noted in the calendar of February events that on 1 February 1662, 350 years ago, the Ming loyalist Chinese leader of mixed Japanese and Chinese heritage, Koxinga, effectively ended the 38 year Dutch rule of the island we know as Taiwan. The wikipedia article is reasonably long about Koxinga or if you want more then there are three books to consider.

Jonathan Clements Coxinga and the Fall of the Ming Dynasty

Tonio Andrade How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century and Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West

 

Pictures and details about a pair of Qing-era matchlock firearms

Source here

An interesting post in the Ethnographic Arms and Armour Forum on two Chinese Qing-era matchlock firearms. Further down the post there is some interesting detail about the movement of firearms into East Asia.

Ancient Chinese copper sword discovered in Jiangxi Province

(Source: www.china.org.cn)

A well preserved warring states sword has been found in East China according to this article:

A copper sword dating back more than 2,200 years has been discovered in east China's Jiangxi Province, local archaeologists said.

The design and shape of the sword indicate that it was forged during the Warring States Period (475 BC - 221 BC), according to Li Guoli, curator of the Nanchang Museum, where the sword is currently being stored.

Still worried about China's new ASBM, the untested one

The DF-21D (Source: www.china-defense-mashup.com)

The word capability is a very over-used term in military circles, especially amongst analysts and journalists. Just because a country acquires a new weapon it does not mean that the country has a new capability. True, a badly used bomb is still a bomb but it may not deliver to its full potential if it is not used properly. An untested weapon is also not really a capability. This is all just a long introduction to explaining why I am bemused about all the hype surrounding the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) supposedly being developed or even deployed in China. This article at the East Asia Forum is more restrained than most but it is still painting the untested DF-21D as a game changer for the US Navy when operating in the Pacific Ocean:

Chinese military planners, without even fully testing the ASBM system, have placed US forces in a challenging position. Even if General Chen’s statement was an exaggeration or a theoretical range, this debate demonstrates the difficulties US strategists face in dealing with this new weapon. And now with the possibility of a larger range, US planners will need to ponder long and hard if and how they might use surface combatants in the Pacific Ocean during a conflict.

The neighbours are still worried about China's military

A read of the Channel news Asia website today showed that politicians in both Japan and Taiwan remarked about their respective concerns over China's military growth. In Japan, the new Japanese Prime Minister told the Japanese Diet of his concerns about China's military:

Japan's new Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said Wednesday he was concerned about China's military build-up, urging his giant neighbour to act as a "responsible member of the international community".

While on a visit to the the US the new Taiwanese opposition leader talked of her plans to strengthen Taiwan's defense posture:

Taiwan's opposition presidential candidate on Tuesday assured the United States she would not whip up tensions with China if elected but pledged to boost defense spending to counterbalance a rising Beijing.

These similar statements are probably more about the similarities in the respective politics of Taiwan and Japan rather than about any new issues with China. Both countries are concerned about China's military but there has been no recent specific trigger. The calls by themselves are not unique and were probably targeted at domestic audiences rather than China.

The US DoD's annual report on China is out, as is the Chinese reaction

The annual report for 2011 by the US Department of Defence (DoD) on China's military developments has been released. The report covered off on the latest military developments of interest to the US, including China's new aircraft carrier and the reported development of an anti-ship ballistic missile. The report seemed balanced and continued to push the theme that China is developing and should be more transparent in what its military policy is. Not surprisingly the report was written from the perspective of US concerns and so focused very much on maritime issues. Two of the three special topics were maritime focused and there was also a chapter on China and Taiwan. The carrier received prominent mention even though it has only conducted a single sea trial. The anti-ship ballistic missile rated discussion but there have been no tests of this capability. The land component of China's forces received less coverage and a land focus was also not prevalent. The report mentioned Central Asia as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) but these topics did not gain much prominence. A report on the current US military would no doubt talk about counter-insurgency but this report mentioned that term once and that was in relation to a Chinese need to combat a Taiwanese insurgency should China ever invade the island.

Still awaiting the US DoD annual report on China's military capability

While many people in the world were awaiting the final installment of the Harry Potter saga, a small group of keen China defence watchers were being kept on the edge with the ongoing delay to the release of the annual US DoD report on China's military capabilities. The Wall Street Journal blog quoted one US Republican who was keen to have a read. He also showed his displeasure at the delay back in May as well. That same article had a good list of what people would hope to see in the report. Last year the report was also released around this time of year despite being due in March. Apparently the report will be out this week. It may not be Harry Potter but there will be people awaiting it with almost as much 'excitement.' I think the Chinese themselves will be amongst that list.

 Some people are having trouble coping with the delay

FPRI's scholar's testimony on Taiwan before the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs

Taiwan is unfortunately not a place that I know much about. I am trying to rectify that situation as I can understand that Taiwan has significance to the Chinese strategic view of East Asia. I have generally seen the Chinese strategic view towards Taiwan as being passive, that is willing to wait for political negotiations to achieve unification rather than resorting to war; as long as Taiwan did not declare independence.' However, according to the FPRI's Dr June Teufel Dreyer's testimony (link) before the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs the mainland Chinese actually have a far more aggressive plan for Taiwan:

"...the Chinese military has been a focus of my research efforts for the past several decades. In this capacity, I regularly read military journals from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) dealing with defense matters. The militant tone of the articles contained therein is striking, as is the way Chinese strategists view Taiwan—not as an end in itself, a terra irredenta that must be possessed, but as a stepping stone for reaching China’s larger goals of controlling the regional sea lanes and beyond. Chinese analysts concentrate on the importance of Taiwan to the PRC’s strategic future. The inability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to break out of the first island chain into the Pacific without first taking Taiwan is standard commentary in Chinese journals."

The next paragraph follows in a similar vein:

"Another supposition that is noticeable in the journals is that the PLA navy can attain decisive command of the seas by projecting power eastward from Taiwan. One commentator states that Taiwan is currently a shackle but that, if possessed by the PRC, would be the key to the open ocean. Since the island occupies the mid-section of the first island chain, PRC strategists reason, its capture would cut the chain in two. Chinese fleet and naval aviation units could use Taiwan as a major base. Sea and air combat radii from bases on the island would reach the flanks of Japan and the Philippines."

Is the new Chinese aircraft carrier a major capability increase?

There have been a number of articles recently discussing China's new aircraft carrier, although I think that this one is worth reading. The Chinese have been reconditioning the former Soviet/Russian/Ukrainian aircraft carrier Varyag. The ship has had a varied record, being under construction in the early 1990s before having construction halted in 1992. Although purchased by Chinese interests six years later the ship did not arrive in Dalian, China until 2002, ten years after work ceased. It has been undergoing refit ever since. This does not represent a capability. Yes, the Chinese now have an aircraft carrier but even the Soviets recognised the limitations of this class. According to the Military Periscope database (subscription required) without catapults, planes cannot launch with a significant weapons payload for offensive operations, consequently it was described as a test platform.

The Philippines, the US, the Spratly Islands and regional engagement

The media has been full of stories recently about increased tensions in the South China Sea due to the ongoing territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands. One of the most interesting developments in the most recent verbal exchanges has been the US announcement that it would review the military needs of the Philippines for defence. This can be seen from a number of different ways but I would like to explore just two views on this statement. First, it showed that the US is moving beyond its focus on terrorism in Southeast Asia. Second, it showed that the US was not withdrawing into an isolationist stance.

Visit to the First Emperor Exhibit at the Art Gallery of NSW

Over the break, I had a chance to visit the First Emperor Exhibit at the Art Gallery of New South Wales. It was a fascinating exhibit and worth a visit if you have a chance. It will remain open until 13 March 2011. There is a free iPhone application to accompany the exhibit if you want to do some reading beforehand. The exhibit looks beyond just the entombed warriors to examine other finds associated with the First Emperor of China but the entombed warriors are obviously the main draw card, well they were for me. I bought the accompanying catalogueas it has some interesting articles and of course pictures as you are not allowed to take photos in the exhibit.

Learning or not learning from the enemy

There is the old saying that necessity is the mother of invention and it is true that the necessity engendered by war has led to a number of inventions as well. Sometimes the operating environment faced by both sides has led to innovation, sometimes with different approaches. The trench stalemate of the Western Front in WW1 was a good example. The British built tanks to overcome the environment while the Germans focused on further developing stormtrooper units. These different approaches are caused by a combination of industrial capability, cultural attitudes, received wisdom, etc. Sometimes a superior capability of the enemy also leads to invention, such as can be seen by Confederate American responses to the blockade by the USA of southern ports that inspired the CSS Virginia and the CSS Hunley. Of course this is not always true. Sometimes a superior capability from the enemy does not see change in the opposing side. It took a long time for the French to counter the English longbow despite defeats at Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt. Two other examples that jump to mind came from the Imjin War of 1592-98 in Korea. The Turtle Ship or Kobukson of Admiral Yi caused many problems for the Japanese but was not taken up by China or Japan. Likewise, the Japanese castles built in southern Korea withstood sieges and attacks but were not copied by either the Chinese or Koreans in their later defensive works. This post will look at these two examples and offer perhaps some explanation as to why they did not inspire imitation.

Qing transitional weapons - the bow vs the matchlock

While looking around the British Museum I came across the painting below (the image comes from this site). I was struck by the painting because of the presence of both firearms and bows with the Qing Bannermen. I found it interesting that the soldiers were armed with both types of weapons, imagining that it would be hard to manage both during a battle.

 

A Chinese siege - Xiangyang 1206-07

I recently purchased Stephen Turnbull's book on Chinese Walled Cities 221 BC - AD 1644 (Osprey Fortress 84). Fortuitously I have also borrowed an older book Chinese Ways in Warfare, Frank A. Kierman Jr and John K. Fairbank, editors. Both these books bring home the concept of fortifications in China, that is the focus on cities rather than stand alone castles such as occurred in Europe and Japan.  Cities were built with walls around them and the populace were expectedto supplement the small professional garrisons during sieges. Even small towns would have solid walls. The city of Xiangyang or Hsiang-yang saw two sieges within the 13th century. It was a typical walled city with the Han river providing an extra defence to the north. The siege of 1206-07 is featured in both books but there was little additional information on the internet.

Red Cliffs article

I posted about the John Woo film epic Red Cliffs in November 2008. For those looking for more information Ralph D. Sawyer, author of numerous books on Chinese military history and espionage, has written an article called Conundrum at Red Cliffs for the April/May issue of Military History. Ican not find it soft copy on the web but it is worth the money to purchase the magazine and  read. (The edition also has an article about the Duke of Marlborough). Mr Sawyer outlines the battle and then analyses why Cao Cao made the mistakes that he did, far more than the usual chronological treatment of battles in most magazines.

"Ultimately, however, it was surprise that carried the day, not physical strength, conditioning, experience or battlefield prowess...Cao Cao's powerful and highly successful force was defeated by the simple execution of a mundane subterfuge and the exploitation of incendiary measures..." (page 70, Military History, April/May 2009)

If you want to do further reading about the battle then Mr Sawyer recommends one of his own books, Fire and Water: The Art of Incendiary and Aquatic Warfare in China. It is available at Amazon and also cheaply (for those in Australia) from Clouston and Hall.